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The excellent articles by Brian Bornstein and Sean McCabe1 and
Jennifer Robbennolt2 in this Symposium document the current state
of two longstanding debates in jury scholarship—one on the external
validity of mock jury experiments, the other on the relative factfinding ability of juries versus judges. Over a decade ago, I examined
the state of evidence in each debate.3 With respect to what Bornstein
and McCabe refer to as “consequentiality”—the question of whether
decisions result in real outcomes4—in 1989 I noted that
“[e]xperiments comparing mock jurors with subjects who thought
they were actually trying a case have been inconclusive; different
studies have found mock jurors’ verdicts to be more lenient, less lenient, and no different from those of ‘actual’ jurors.”5 Bornstein and
McCabe note with some frustration that there is no new evidence to
clarify these results6—indeed, no studies have examined the issue
since 1986.7 In stark contrast, Robbennolt shows that there has been
considerable empirical progress on the second issue since 1993,8
when I was able to identify only two direct experimental comparisons
of judge and juror judgmental performance.9
* Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley.
1. Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2005).
2. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005). In the interest of full disclosure, I recently coauthored a paper with Robbennolt. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, John M. Darley &
Robert J. MacCoun, Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision
Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2003).
3. Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 passim (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) [hereinafter MacCoun, Inside the Black Box]; see also Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046,
1046-50 (1989) [hereinafter MacCoun, Experimental Research].
4. See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at footnote 450-52.
5. MacCoun, Experimental Research, supra note 3, at 1046.
6. Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at footnote 452.
7. See id. at 452 n.39, 453 tbl.1.
8. Robbennolt, supra note 2, at ____.
9. See MacCoun, Inside the Black Box, supra note 3, at 166 (citing Edmund S. Howe
& Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Intention and Outcome Information by Students and
Circuit Court Judges: Design Economy and Individual Differences, 22 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 102 (1992); and Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992)).
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Perhaps framing these questions as “debates” is misleading, since
in neither case can we expect empirical research to provide an unequivocal, dichotomous verdict like “mock jury research is valid” or
“judges are superior.” Both issues involve inevitable trade-offs among
goals—epistemological goals in the first case and legal policy goals in
the second.
I. THE REALISM OF JURY RESEARCH
The “realism” of the mock jury paradigm involves at least three
dimensions: whether the “stimulus case” materials resemble actual
trials, whether the samples resemble real jury pool populations, and
whether the psychology of assessing fictional cases resembles what
jurors experience when reaching real verdicts involving real litigants. Brian Bornstein has already made a major contribution to our
understanding of the first two dimensions; his 1999 meta-analysis of
twenty years of mock jury research found little indication that either
stimulus case realism (for example, paper-pencil versus audiotape
versus videotape) or study population (for example, student versus
general community) systematically influences research conclusions.10
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that efforts to maximize realism
on these dimensions have more to do with research marketing than
scientific validity; whether the marketing payoff is worth the tremendous opportunity costs is an open question that funders ought to
take seriously.11
Readers outside the jury research community might be surprised
to find so little attention given to the third dimension—the consequentiality issue. But this neglect is understandable, given the small
size and limited resources of the jury research community. A handful
of prior studies with inconsistent results provides little incentive for
investing the considerable effort in a new experiment, unless something important is at stake—an unresolved legal policy debate (for
example, jury size or bifurcating damages) or a competition among
basic theories of juror judgment (for example, “cognitive averaging”
versus story-based or constraint satisfaction models12). Perhaps new
research on consequentiality would persuade policymakers to take
mock jury research more seriously—at least if consequentiality

10. Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still
Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999).
11. Videotaped trial reenactments, the use of jury pool volunteers, and mock jury deliberations conducted in courthouse settings add greatly to the expense and duration of an
experiment; a junior researcher could plausibly conduct three or four low-fidelity experiments in university settings with the same or less time and money.
12. See INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING (Reid
Hastie ed., 1993) [hereinafter INSIDE THE JUROR]; MacCoun, Experimental Research, supra
note 3; Robbennolt, Darley & MacCoun, supra note 2.
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proved inconsequential. But the issue seems unlikely to be the only
(or even a major) obstacle to having our research findings drive major legal policy decisions. Far from being unique to the mock jury literature, the complaint that policymakers ignore social science research seems nearly universal.13
A lack of real decision consequences, on its face, seems relevant to
the assessment of mock jury research. But as Bornstein and McCabe
point out, there are qualitatively distinct ways in which outcomes in
mock and real jury trials might systematically differ: a variable
might have a greater effect on verdicts in one setting than in the
other, it might influence outcomes in one setting but have no effect
on other, or it might affect each setting in opposite ways.14 Though it
is easy to see how realism might influence the magnitude of particular correlations among evidentiary or procedural factors and verdicts,15 it is hard to identify compelling reasons why mock and actual
juror reasoning might differ systematically in kind, rather than degree. Various theories in the behavioral science judgment and decision literatures address the realism question, but as far as I can tell,
none predict important qualitative differences of the sort that would
make mock jury research misleading.
The most straightforward possibility is that real jurors may try
harder than mock jurors—think harder, deliberate longer, and ponder more deeply. The widely influential “elaboration likelihood
model” of Richard Petty and John Cacioppo has stimulated a great
deal of research on the effects of motivation on reasoning and persuasion.16 That work shows that information in the environment
(whether verbal arguments, visual evidence, or other nonverbal
stimuli) can influence opinion formation via one of two qualitatively
different routes.17 The “central route” involves systematic “elabora13. See, e.g., DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC
POLICYMAKING (2003); RICHARD P. NATHAN, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT: USES AND
MISUSES (1988); THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS (William Alonso & Paul Starr eds., 1987); Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 259 passim (1998).
14. See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at 452-57; see also Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior, 3 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 107 (1979).
15. E.g., Bornstein, supra note 10; Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et al., The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219
(1999).
16. See Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of
Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986). For a very similar theory and an extensive literature review, see ALICE H.
EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 305-25 (1993).
17. Indeed, perhaps the most important development in psychology in the past decade
or so has been the convergent discovery (across various research domains) that the brain
has at least two qualitatively different modes of reasoning—one fast, automatic, associative, and largely unconscious; the other slow, controlled, verbal, and largely conscious. See
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tion” of information—that is, “thinking.” The “peripheral route” involves a casual, and usually temporary, coloring of one’s views due to
superficial cues (such as physical attractiveness or humor) or heuristic “rules of thumb” (such as “more arguments are better than fewer
arguments”). Peripheral cues are most influential when the persuasion target’s motivation or ability to scrutinize logical arguments is
low. Argument quality becomes more important when motivation
and ability are high. But studies testing this theory mostly examine
reactions to consumer advertising, rather than explicit decision problems involving intellectual or moral judgment. The mock jury task,
by contrast, is highly engaging. In recent mock jury research, even
participants with relatively low motivation to scrutinize evidence
were sensitive to argument quality.18 And as Bornstein and McCabe
note, considerable research on the effects of incentives for accuracy—
even extremely large monetary rewards—has failed to show any consistent effect on decision quality in cognitively engaging judgment
tasks.19
Another possibility is that motivation favors a particular verdict
option. For example, based on the standard decision theoretic account of trade-offs among false-positive and false-negative errors,20
Bornstein and McCabe argue that if jurors are assumed to focus on
avoiding false convictions of innocent people, then the greater the
penalty severity, the greater the perceived cost of error.21 “As this
perceived cost of error increases, jurors should require more evidence
of guilt before voting to convict. With this shift in criterion, jurors
should therefore be less likely to vote guilty when the penalty is more
severe.”22
Ceteris paribus, this is a straightforward decision theory prediction. But what it ignores is the fact that the other decision error—
falsely acquitting a guilty defendant—is also considerably more
costly in actual trials. Thus, decision theory is mute unless there are
compelling reasons to believe that the effects of realism are asymmetric, increasing the cost of false positives more than the cost of
false negatives. I suppose it is an empirical question, but a priori I
see no particular reason to expect such an asymmetric effect.
KEITH E. STANOVICH, THE ROBOT’S REBELLION: FINDING MEANING IN THE AGE OF DARWIN
31-79 (2004).
18. Donna Shestowsky & Leonard M. Horowitz, How the Need for Cognition Scale
Predicts Behavior in Mock Jury Deliberations, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305, 333 (2004).
19. Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at 465-66 & n.141; see also Colin F. Camerer
& Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and
Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999).
20. See INSIDE THE JUROR, supra note 12; MacCoun, Experimental Research, supra
note 3.
21. Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at 460.
22. Id. at 460-61.
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Another relevant theoretical account is Irving Janis and Leon
Mann’s 1977 conflict model.23 A full presentation is beyond the scope
of this Comment, but in a nutshell, Janis and Mann distinguish
three styles of decision under conflict and stress: vigilance (a careful
and systematic weighing of costs and benefits), hypervigilance
(roughly, “panic”), and defensive avoidance (preemptive efforts to rationalize or bolster what is expected to be an inevitable bad outcome).24 Janis and Mann argue that vigilance can only occur under
conditions of moderate stress and when there is an adequate time
period for gathering and weighing information.25 When there is insufficient time, they predict hypervigilance.26 When every choice poses
serious risks with no apparent solution, they predict defensive avoidance.27 The Janis and Mann model has served an important role in
helping researchers understand how real-world decision processes
may depart from the standardized and idealized conditions of our
laboratory experiments. Yet the model has no obvious implications
for the comparison of mock and real jury trials. Real jury trials occur
at a stately, almost glacial pace, without the urgency and immediacy
faced by decisionmakers in the case studies examined by Janis and
Mann. And while it may be that no verdict option offers a clear guarantee of success, as noted above, there is no clear reason why this is
any more or less true in real trials than in the mock jury situation.
Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock have offered a related account
of the effects of real-world pressures on human decisionmaking, focusing on the role of accountability.28 They argue that the effects of
expecting to be held accountable for a decision will vary depending on
whether the ‘decisionmaker knows the views of the various stakeholders and other audiences that will scrutinize the decision.29 If the
audience views are unknown, the decisionmaker will be motivated to
engage in “preemptive self-criticism”30—analogous to the “vigilant”
style of careful reasoning described by Janis and Mann.31 If the audience views are known, the decisionmaker will engage in some “attitude shifting”—moving in the direction of the audience’s viewpoint.32
23. IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, A Conflict Model of Decision Making, in DECISION
MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 45, 45-80
(1977).
24. Id. at 52-64.
25. Id. at 59.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 57-58.
28. See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999).
29. See id. at 256-57.
30. Id. at 257.
31. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 23, at 59.
32. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 28, at 256. Tetlock also considered what happens
when one only discovers that one is accountable after a decision has already been ren-
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Presumably, real jurors are more accountable for their decisions than
mock jurors; the stakes are higher and trials, by their very nature,
are highly public acts.33 But the filtering process that produces trials
almost guarantees that the “audience” will not share a single point of
view. Litigants are under enormous pressure to settle or plea bargain
when the evidence is stacked against them, and, to some extent,
changes of venue and venire compensate for overwhelming public
prejudice at odds with actual evidence strength. Again, it is hard to
find clear a priori grounds for rejecting mock jury data on the basis of
accountability effects.
In sum, there are a variety of theoretical perspectives in the
judgment literature that suggest ways in which real-world behavior
might depart from stylized laboratory tasks. But none of those theories offer clear predictions about the effects of jury verdict consequentiality. That is not a shortcoming of the theories; rather, the
variables they highlight are not variables that cleanly differentiate
mock juries from real juries.
Implicit in the debate about mock jury realism is the notion that
there are better research alternatives. The mock jury method is
sometimes viewed as a “second-best” response to legal and ethical
barriers to observing actual jury deliberations. But in point of fact,
even absent those barriers, actual jury trials have many limitations
for scientific research. There are inherent trade-offs among behavioral science methods. Statistical analyses of actual jury verdicts,
post-trial juror interviews, shadow juries, field experiments, and
mock jury experiments each offer certain advantages, but also certain weaknesses.34 For example, statistical analysis of actual trial
outcomes is an important research tool but is notoriously weak at establishing causation.35 Experimentation—specifically, random assignment to condition—is a powerful inferential tool for addressing
causal questions that purely statistical analyses cannot answer. But
there are many logistical, legal, and ethical barriers to the experimental manipulation of variables of interest in actual trials, such as
new rules of evidence, new procedures, litigant characteristics, or
dered. In such situations, accountability cannot affect the decision, but if the audience is
dissatisfied, the decisionmaker may engage in “defensive bolstering” in an effort to rationalize the position—analogous to Janis and Mann’s notion of defensive avoidance. See id. at
257-58; JANIS & MANN, supra note 23, at 57-58.
33. This is mitigated somewhat by the partial anonymity of jurors and the fact that
they are not formally required to explain their verdicts. But increasingly aggressive media
coverage is undermining both these caveats.
34. MacCoun, Inside the Black Box, supra note 3.
35. For example, alleged “deep-pocket” effects in compensatory damage awards apparently result from the real-world confounding of defendant wealth with other factors
that distinguish corporations from individual people. See Robert J. MacCoun, Differential
Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121 (1996).
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variations in trial evidence. We should not rely solely on mock jury
research, nor should we abandon it in the belief that “more realistic”
methods are necessarily less vulnerable to faulty inference. Empirical progress requires triangulation across fallible sources of evidence.
II. JUDGES VERSUS JURIES
There is an entirely different sense in which the lack of grounding
in “reality” might hinder sociolegal research. In many areas of research on judgment and decisionmaking, progress is made by comparing a decisionmaker’s judgments to some independently determined criterion of “truth”: Did the radiologist correct identify a cancerous tumor? Did it rain when the meteorologist said it would? This
approach relies on epistemology’s traditional “correspondence theory”
of truth.36 In sociolegal research, we rarely have any independent criterion—if we did, we probably would not rely on trials, at least not
for factual questions.37 Instead, we either compare types of factfinders directly, or we compare factfinder performance to some normative theory that prescribes appropriate versus inappropriate
sources of information and rules for combining that information.38
The recent judge-juror comparisons reviewed by Jennifer Robbennolt are noteworthy for use of both of these latter strategies in combination.39 The direct judge-jury comparisons tell us whether these
actors differ, but such comparisons do not tell us who was performing
better; for example, we cannot simply assume that whatever the
judges favor is the better judgment, unless perhaps the judgment involves a narrow legal technicality. But the use of experimental tasks
grounded in normative theories of inference is allowing researchers
to calibrate these judge-jury differences relative to some independent
standard for judgment. Of course, these inferential standards address only the inferential dimension of legal factfinding; a full comparison of judges and juries must consider other factors, such as
community representation, perceived fairness and legitimacy, cost,
and efficiency.40

36. See KENNETH R. HAMMOND, HUMAN JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: IRREDUCIBLE
UNCERTAINTY, INEVITABLE ERROR, UNAVOIDABLE INJUSTICE (1996).
37. See Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 728 (1999).
38. For a taxonomy of strategies for assessing judgment accuracy, see Reid Hastie &
Kenneth A. Rasinski, The Concept of Accuracy in Social Judgment, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 193 (Daniel Bar-Tal & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1988).
39. See Robbennolt, supra note 2.
40. For public views of how judges and juries differ on these dimensions, see Robert J.
MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988).
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Testing performance relative to explicit theories of performance
may offer a rhetorical advantage in addition to any scientific benefits. It may be naïve for mock jury researchers to hope to influence
policy using our empirical findings. Empirical research by econometricians plays an important role in legal policy, but its influence
surely pales by comparison to the theoretical impact of the law and
economics movement, which emphasizes ideas over data. Mock jury
experiments are particularly well-suited for testing our ideas about
how legal factfinding occurs, but if we want to influence legal policymaking, offering good arguments may be more powerful than defending arguably good data.

